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SOUTH AFRICA: USING THE LAW TO
ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN A
PIGMENTOCRACY
Rex S. Heinke*
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER. By
John Dugard. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
1978. Pp. xix, 470. Cloth, $27.50; paper, $12.50.

John Dugard, Professor of Law at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, has written an excellent
critical analysis of the South African legal system. His discussion
traces its development, beginning with the importation of
Roman-Dutch law in 1652 by the Dutch East India Company,
through the present day's uneasy synthesis of Roman-Dutch and
English legal principles. Yet, this is not simply an historical overview; rather it is an examination of the development of Western
legal theories and institutions in a non-Western setting. In particular, Professor Dugard discusses the conflict between parliamentary sovereignty and a judiciary's power to declare laws unconstitutional.
Professor Dugard also examines in detail South Africa's racial laws, which make the immutable characteristic of race the
primary determinant of legal,' social, and political status. South
Africa prides itself on being an esteemed member of the community of Western nations and often refers to itself as the last
bastion of Western civilization in Africa. In actuality, it is "a
pigmentocracy in which all political power is vested in a white
oligarchy, which in turn is controlled by an Afrikaner ~lite" (p.7).
Professor Dugard also analyzes the repressive political laws which
South Africa has devised to maintain this system.
With regard to judicial review, Professor Dugard extensively
discusses the battle to deprive colored (i.e., of mixed racial ancestry) voters in the Cape Province of their right to elect members
of their own race to Parliament. The South African Constitution
was written primarily by the British after their victory in the
Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902. The Constitution provided voting
rights for "coloreds" in the Cape Province (section 35) and equal
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status for the English and Afrikaans languages (section 137). Section 152 forbade the amendm~nt of sections 35, 137, and 152
"unless the Bill be passed by both Houses of Parliament sitting
together, and at the reading be agreed to by not less than twothirds of the total members of both Houses of Parliament." Other
than these clauses, commonly referred to as the "entrenched
clauses," South Africa's Constitution contained no Bill of Rights.
In 1948, having coined the word "ap!;lrtheid" as its slogan,
the National Party ("Nats") came to power and has ruled South
Africa ever since. In 1951, the Nats stripped colored voters of their
right to elect members of their own race to Parliament by enacting the Separate Representation of Voters Act. The Appellate
Division, South Africa's highest court, promptly invalidated that
act in the Vote case on the grounds that each House had passed
the act separately rather than sitting together as the entrenched
clauses required.
The N ats quickly responded by passing the High Court of
Parliament Act, which provided that if the Appellate Division
invalidated an Act of Parliament, then Parliament, sitting as the
High Court of Parliament, could review the Appellate Division's
decision. The newly established High Court of Parliament immediately reversed the Appellate Division's decision in the Vote
case. The Appellate Division then invalidated the High Court of
Parliament Act, on the ground that the entrenched cla~ses provided for judicial review by a real court, not by Parliament disguised as a court.
Lacking the votes in Parliament to eliminate the colored
franchise by the necessary two-thirds majority of both Houses,
the Nats decided to pack both the Appellate Division and the
Senate (the upper house of Parliament). By a scheme reminiscent
of President Roosevelt's plan to pack the U.S. Supreme Court,
the Appellate Division was increased from five to eleven members
for any case where the constitutionality of an Act of Parliament
was at issue. The size of the Senate was almost doubled and the
methods for selecting the new Senators ensured the Nats a twothirds majority of both Houses sitting together. This done, section
35 was removed from the Constitution, colored voters were only
allowed to elect token whites to represent them in Parliament,
and the courts were barred from ruling on the validity of any Act
of Parliament other than one affecting the remaining two entrenched clauses. By a ten-to-one vote, the newly reconstituted
Appellate Division sustained these laws.
Professor Dugard's description of these events conveys their
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drama and their importance for the future of South Africa. Unrestrained by a Bill of Rights and a judiciary to enforce it, the
N ats moved vigorously to implement apartheid. The domestic
political opposition proved no match for the Nats. The black
political opposition, primarily the African National Congress and
the Pan-African Congress, was crushed with a series of politically repressive laws, discussed below. The white political opposition was either substantially in agreement with white control
of South Africa, e.g., the United Party, or too weak to do more
than delay for a short time the establishment of apartheid, e.g.,
the National Union of South African Students.
Through a series of sweeping laws, the Nats legalized a fourtier racial caste system. At the top are 4,300,000 whites, followed
by 2,400,000 coloreds, then 746,000 Asians, and finally 18,600,000
Africans. What distinguishes apartheid from other forms of racism is its explicit endorsement of skin color as the basis for the
application of laws.
There are myriad racial laws which make up this system: the
Group Areas Act, which is the legal authority for the forced removal of blacks from their homes in order to increase segregation;
the ironically entitled Extension of University Education Act,
which segregated the previously "open" universities of the Witwatersrand and Cape Town; and the infamous pass law system,
that requires all Africans to carry passports in their own country.
These are only a few of the many apartheid laws Professor Dugard
examines.
The centerpiece of apartheid is the "homeland" policy,
which is also analyzed by Professor Dugard. Pursuant to this
policy, South Africa is being balkanized into a number of
"homelands" for black tribal groups, including the Northern
Sotho, Southern Sotho, Swazi, Tsonga, Tsevana, Venda, Xhosa,
and Zulu. In theory, these homelands are to become independent
nations; two have already been granted nominal "independence,"
although all nations but South Africa have ignored them diplomatically. In practice, important matters, such as defense, foreign affairs, and, to a considerable extent, internal security, will
not be under the control of the homelands, and all important
decisions must be approved by the white government in South
Africa. Apartheid's theory is that all members of each tribe,
whether or not born in their homeland, are citizens of a prescribed
homeland and not citizens of the Republic of South Africa, even
if they were born and have always lived in the Republic. The most
developed of the homelands, the Transkei, has 1.5 million such
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citizens, and there are another 7.5 million similarly situated Africans whose homelands are being or have yet to be created. In
addition, there are almost two and one-half million colored people
and three quarters of a million Asians who have no homeland and
have no prospect of meaningful political rights in white South
Africa.
A central failure of the homelands policy is its inability to
acknowledge that South Africa depends absolutely upon black
labor whose claim to fair treatment cannot be avoided by creating
fictional countries. Moreover, the allotment of only thirteen percent of South Africa's land for the "homelands" of approximately
seventy percent of its population emphasizes that the
"homelands" are- no solution to black demands for political
power.
To maintain its pigmentocracy, South Africa has erected an
enormous set of legal restrictions that severely limit civil rights.
Possibly the most widely used method of silencing opposition to
apartheid is the "banning order." By issuing a banning order, the
Minister of Justice may without a hearing impose a combinatfon
of the following restrictions: that the banned person may not
leave a certain area, e.g., a suburb or even his home; that he must
periodically, often daily, report to a police station; that he can
only visit with a specified number of persons at a time, sometimes
only one family member at a time; and that he may not enter
certain areas, e.g., a union organizer is often banned from all
factories, or a student from all universities, thus preventing him
from carrying on his normal occupation. Moreover, the writings
or statements of such persons may not be quoted or published
anywhere in South Africa. Banning orders are usually imposed for
five years and are often successively reimposed. Since no banning
order has ever been overturned by the South African courts,
there is, as a practical matter, no relief from such orders.
The Terrorism Act is probably the clearest example of how
far South Africa has veered from the basic precepts of Western
legal systems. It reverses the normal presumption of innocence in
criminal cases so that those charged with its violation, which is a
capital offense, are presumed guilty unless they can prove their
innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. The Act's terms are so
vague that it is difficult to know when they are being violated.
For example, the Terrorism Act makes it an offense to commit
any act "with intent to endanger the maintenance of law and
order." The requisite intent is presumed if the act is deemed
likely to "embarrass the State in the administration of its af-
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fairs." Such uncertainty is a hallmark of South African law and
discourages most people from engaging in any activity that might
even arguably be illegal.
The Terrorism Act also provides for indefinite periods of detention for people charged with its violation. Only government
officials are entitled to information "relating to or obtained from
any detainee." On this legal authority, the police refuse to identify those detained, and the Minister of Justice has even refused
to tell members of Parliament who is being held. Thus, when
people disappear without trace, it is often assumed that they have
been arrested by the Bureau of State Security (B.O.S.S.) or some
other police agency. This secret detention process frequently
leads to the torturing and even the death of detainees. The recent
torture and death of Steve Biko, while under such detention, is
one of the few such incidents that has been widely publicized in
the United States.
Professor Dugard traces the history and effects of these and
many other South African political laws. He also analyzes such
laws in terms of the philosophical conflict between natural law
and legal positivism. Those who wish to understand South Africa
and its legal system will benefit greatly by reading Professor Dugard's book which discusses these and numerous other issues.
This book, then, inevitably raises the question of South Africa's future. With Namibia and Rhodesia slowly but inexorably
slipping out of its orbit, South Africa will soon confront blackruled countries on all of its borders. This situation will surely lead
to increasingly violent attempts to alter the South African status
quo.
Afrikaaners consider themselves as much a part of Africa as
Americans consider themselves a part of the United States of
America. They would no more leave Africa than Americans would
leave the United States. Thus, even if many of the Englishspeaking white South Africans leave South Africa when it has to
fight guerillas, a bloody race war seems inevitable. One must
hope that the people of South Africa will awaken to their mutual
dependence before relations are so poisoned that no compromise
can be reached. But one must wonder whether that point has not
already been reached.

